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INTRODUCTION
Over the last 15 to 20 years, paradoxical interventions
--the most common and controversial of which is symptom
prescription--have been popular treatment strategies in
psychotherapy.

A brief survey of the professional

literature reveals that there is much disagreement among
therapists regarding how these techniques work, when they
are indicated, and even what constitutes a paradoxical
intervention.

It is not surprising,

then,

to find similar

dissent regarding the relative importance of the ethical
issues involved in the use of paradoxical interventions.
Some therapists employ paradoxical techniques
frequently and tend to minimize the ethical questions
associated with their use (e.g., Fisch, Weakland,
1982; Haley, 1987).

Others say that,

& Segal,

in consideration

of the ethical dilemmas that the use of paradoxical
interventions raise, such methods should only be employed
as a last resort (e.g., Fischer, Anderson, & Jones, 1981;
Van Hoose & Kottler,

1985).

Still others, such as Whan

(1983), would contend that the use of paradoxical
interventions is inherently unethical and their use can
never be justified.

Further, critics such as Henderson
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(1987) and Schmidt (1986) warn that psychotherapists who
use paradoxical interventions may be inviting claims of
malpractice.
Two of the primary ethical issues regarding the use
of paradoxical interventions relate to the use of deception
and the violation of informed consent., The first
objection--that paradoxical interventions involve
deception--centers around the idea that dishonesty, or
a lack of sincerity, is incompatible with the trust that
is essential to the therapeutic relationship (Whan, 1983).
For example, consider the use of symptom prescription in
directing an insomniac to stay awake or instructing an
impotent man to prevent himself from having an erection.
Since one important purpose of therapy is to eliminate
distress, are such methods "insincere," and,
unacceptable?

thus,

The use of deception in employing paradoxical

interventions is a significant ethical problem which has
been commented upon by numerous writers (e.g., Deschenes

& Shepperson,

1983; Haley, 1987; Johnson,

1987; Tennen, Eron,

& Rohrbaugh,

1985; Watzlawick, Weakland,

1986; Lindley,

1985; Van Hoose

& Kottler,

& Fisch, 1974; Weeks & L'Abate,

1982).
The second objection--that the use of paradoxical
interventions violates the client's right to informed
consent--has also been addressed by a number of therapists
2

(e.g., Brown & Slee, 1986; Henderson,

& Milan,

Kolko

1986; Weeks

& L'Abate,

1987; Hunsley, 1988;
1982).

The Ethical

Principles of Psychologists (American Psychological
Association,

1990) require that psychologists provide their

clients with adequate information regarding treatment
procedures so that clients may make informed decisions
about their participation in therapy.

However, fully

disclosing the nature of a paradoxical intervention to
the client may rob the technique of its impact (Hills,
Gruszkos,

& Strong,

1985; Watzlawick, Beavin,

& Jackson,

1967).
It is clear that the use of paradoxical interventions
raises significant ethical questions, particularly in regard
to deception and informed consent.

However, almost no

empirical research has been performed that examines
psychotherapists' attitudes about these controversial
techniques.

The focus of this study was to identify which

aspects of the context in which a symptom prescription
is delivered (i.e., the degree of deception and of informed
consent) affect its acceptability to psychotherapists.

3

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE
Paradoxical Intervention Defined
The use of paradoxical interventions has not been
limited to practitioners of any single theoretical
orientation.

These techniques have been espoused by

therapists from a number of orientations, including
psychodynamic (Greenberg, 1973), existential (Frankl, 1975),
Gestalt (Beisser, 1970), and behavioral (Dunlap, 1928).
However, paradoxical interventions seem to be most widely
used by family systems therapists (e.g., Selvini-Palazzoli,
Boscolo, Cecchin, & Prata, 1978; Watzlawick et al., 1974).
Because paradoxical interventions are described by
therapists of such varying theoretical perspectives, there
is no consensus as to exactly what constitutes a paradoxical
intervention--not even among the acknowledged experts in
the field (Watson, 1985).

At the most simplistic level,

paradoxical interventions seem to conflict with the goals
of therapy (Hirschmann
"common sense."

& Sprenkle,

In fact,

1989); they clash with

the Greek word paradoxos means

"conflicting with expectation" (American Heritage
Dictionary, 1982).

Paradoxical techniques, then, depart

from conventional conceptions of how therapy should be
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conducted.
The four most common types of paradoxical interventions
have been identified by Dowd and Milne (1986) as reframing,
restraining, positioning, and symptom prescription.

In

reframing the therapist provides an alternative meaning
structure to shift the client's perspective about the
problematic behavior--usually to a more positive one.
A therapist may discourage or explicitly prohibit a client
from changing for a period of time when using a paradoxical
technique called restraining.

With positioning a therapist

might agree with (or exaggerate) a client's statements
that reflect a negative view of a situation.

Symptom

prescription involves instructing a client to perform the
problematic behavior or even to exaggerate its occurrence;
sometimes the symptom may be "scheduled" to occur at a
specific time.

Symptom prescription is the most popular

of the various paradoxical interventions (Hirschmann &
Sprenkle, 1989), as well as the most controversial-presumably because of its directiveness.

For these reasons,

symptom prescription is the paradoxical intervention with
which this study is most concerned.
Theories of Paradoxical Intervention
In light of the wide variety of theoretical frameworks
within which the use of paradoxical interventions has been
advocated,

it is not surprising that a number of conflicting
5

rationales have been advanced for their use (Driscoll,
1985; Riebel, 1984).

Among the common explanations are:

utilizing resistance to energize change, interrupting the
system of which the symptom is a part, changing the client's
perspective on the problem, and counteracting the
detrimental effects of excessive effort to solve the
problem.
The classic rationale for the use of paradoxical
interventions is that of the "therapeutic double-bind,"
as described by Watzlawick et al.

(1967).

A therapeutic

double-bind is the opposite of the sort of "pathogenic
double-bind" that has been described as a characteristic
pattern of communication within the families of
schizophrenics (Bateson, Jackson, Haley,

& Weakland,

1956).

It is worth noting that the notion of a double-bind assumes
both an intense relationship between the parties involved
and that the recipient cannot comment upon the double-bind
or withdraw from the situation in which it occurs.
Watzlawick et al.

(1967) contend that a pathogenic

double-bind can only be broken by a countering double-bind.
A pathogenic double-bind places a person in a ''no-win"
situation; for example, consider the parent who complains
that her child does not love her, but rejects the child's
displays of affection.

Now consider the bind that a client

is placed in when the therapist employs a paradoxical
6

intervention.

Psychotherapy is presumably intended to

effect positive changes in the client's life,
therapist tells him/her not to change.

but the

Watzlawick et al.

(1967) contend that this places the client in a therapeutic
double-bind, a "no-lose" situation.

That is, when a

therapist prescribes a client's symptom, the client can
respond in one of two ways (each of which leads to gaining
control over the problem).

If the client disobeys the

therapist's directive, then the symptom disappears; and
if the client performs the symptom, thens/he gains
volitional control over what was formerly perceived to
be an involuntary action.

This gives the locus of symptom

control to the client and O'Connell (1983) asserts that
this is the most important effect of symptom prescription.
Indications and Contraindications for the Use of Paradoxical
Interventions
A survey of the literature on paradoxical interventions
reveals that many therapists deem these techniques
appropriate only after more straightforward approaches
have proven ineffective (e.g., Fischer et al., 1981).
They are typically regarded as last resort methods reserved
for use against chronic patterns of resistance (Papp, 1979).
Clients who fit the descriptions of "therapist-killers"
(Weeks

& L'Abate,

1982) and "help-rejecting complainers"

(Greenberg, 1973) have been suggested as suitable candidates
7

for paradoxical interventions.
In order to reduce the apparent risks associated with
discouraging positive client change, a number of client
types and problems have been put forward as contraindicating
the use of paradoxical interventions.

Papp (1979), for

example, says that paradoxical methods should not be
employed in crisis situations, incest, child abuse, or
with clients having suicidal or homicidal ideations.

Others

would add that paradoxical interventions are too risky
with extremely suggestible clients (Rohrbaugh, Tennen,
Press, & White, 1981), borderline personalities (Greenberg

& Pies,

1983), antisocial personalities, and paranoid

schizophrenics (Weeks

& L'Abate,

1982).

However, Fay (1976)

reports three cases in which paradoxical interventions
were used successfully with paranoid schizophrenics.

This

is but one example of the contradictions that can be found
in the literature as to when paradoxical techniques are
appropriate.
In contrast, Fraser (1984) contends that the use of
paradoxical interventions should be determined much more
idiographically.

He argues that basing decisions regarding

the use of paradoxical techniques upon diagnostic labels
ignores the uniqueness of individual clients.

Fraser

maintains that paradoxical interventions should not be
relegated to last ditch efforts to combat resistance;
8

instead, they should be among a therapist's initial
alternatives in treatment planning.

Further, O'Connell

(1983) believes symptom prescription is best used in the
initial therapy session in order to give the client
something to do toward solving his/her problem immediately
and to cast the therapist in his/her proper role as an
expert who knows best how to help the client.
Research on the Efficacy of Paradoxical Interventions
Seltzer (1986) lists over 80 problems that have been
treated paradoxically--from anorexia to marital problems
to writers block.

However, much of the literature on the

efficacy of paradoxical interventions involves clinical
anecdotes rather than empirical evidence.

DeBord (1989)

reviewed the 25 clinical outcome studies that appeared
in the psychological literature from 1980 to 1987 and found
that 23 (92%) reported some degree of positive outcome--none
indicated any adverse effects.

But the designs of only

12 (48%) of these studies included both a control group
and an objective outcome measure; so half of these studies
lacked two of the most basic features of empirical research.
In addition,

two separate meta-analyses have been

performed on the existing controlled outcome studies.
Hill (1987) examined 15 such studies (with the presenting
problems of insomnia, depression, agoraphobia,
procrastination, and stress) which appeared in the
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professional literature between 1979 and 1985.

Hill

concluded that paradoxical interventions were consistently
and significantly more effective than were non-paradoxical
interventions.

However, Shoham-Salomon and Rosenthal's

(1987) inspection of 12 of the same data sets led them
to a more conservative conclusion--that paradoxical
interventions were equally as effective as conventional
treatments.

Nevertheless, they also judged that paradoxical

interventions produced greater therapeutic change than
other types of treatment with more severe cases as well
as one month after termination.

These two meta-analyses

lend support to the contention that, at least in some cases,
paradoxical interventions are a viable treatment option.
Even so, the use of these controversial methods raises
difficult ethical problems.
Ethical Questions Regarding the Use of Paradoxical
Interventions
Because there is not necessarily any relationship
between what is therapeutically efficacious and what is
ethical, the ethical dilemmas that paradoxical interventions
raise will now be examined.

Critics of these methods

contend that no matter what the outcome research might
indicate about the efficacy of such techniques, the ethical
problems that they raise should take precedence in decisions
about their use (Whan, 1983).

These critics would say

10

that paradoxical techniques are inherently unethical and
should not be used under any circumstances.

On the other

hand, it has been argued that the ethical considerations
regarding their use do not differ significantly from those
of other therapeutic modalities (Brown & Slee,
Hunsley, 1988).

1986;

Thus, Deschenes and Shepperson (1983)

assert that whether or not a paradoxical intervention is
unethical depends not on the nature of the technique itself,
but on its particular application by a specific therapist.
So the context in which a paradoxical intervention is
delivered must be examined in order to make judgments
regarding its ethicality.

Certainly, a therapist's use

of symptom prescription can be presented to a client using
varying degrees of deception and informed consent.

Since

deception and a lack of informed consent have historically
accompanied the use of paradoxical interventions (Haley,
1987), these two ethical problems will be given further
consideration.
Paradoxical Interventions and Deception
Paradoxical interventions are often criticized as
techniques that involve the deception of clients.

For

example, consider symptom prescription whereby clients
are often instructed to continue the problematic behavior
in order that they may learn more about the causes of the
problem.

Generally, the therapist is not concerned about
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the problem's causes, this is just the most effective method
of gaining the client's compliance with the directive.
On a semantic level, Haley (1987) cautiously endorses the
use of "benevolent lies" in therapy, and questions whether
"deceit" is a meaningful concept in the context of
psychotherapy.

To Haley, if the use of deception seems

important to facilitate progress in therapy, then that
is sufficient justification for its use.

But Whan (1983)

wonders where the line can be drawn once any degree of
deception becomes acceptable on the grounds that it may
be therapeutically efficacious.
One problem with the use of deception in employing
symptom prescription is that therapy becomes paternalistic.
Lindley (1987) contends that "strategic communication"
(such as that described in the preceding example) lacks
a "truth-centered motive," so it is therefore disrespectful
and wrong because it assaults the autonomy of clients.
Moreover, in the case of symptom prescription, use of
deception assumes a certain level of incompetence on the
part of the client which justifies active intervention
to serve what the therapist perceives to be the client's
best interests.

Consequently, such use of deception tips

the balance of power even more toward the therapist.

If

it can be granted that the possession of accurate (versus
inaccurate) knowledge translates into increased power in
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a relationship, then deception adds to the power of the
deceiver and diminishes that of the deceived (Bok, 1978).
In addition to problems related to paternalism and
therapist power, there is the pragmatic concern of
maintaining the client's trust.

As Bok (1978) points out,

the most fundamental concern of any person seeking the
help of another is whether they can trust the person whose
aid they seek.

Ultimately, then,

trust is the foundation

of the therapeutic relationship and a therapist's use of
deception would seem to violate that trust.

In addition

to the possible damage to a therapist's credibility that
deception involves, the therapist may be forced into telling
more lies in order to cover for earlier ones.

This is

a problem particularly in close relationships, such as
therapy, where it is unlikely that one lie will suffice
(Bok, 1978).

To illustrate with the example of symptom

prescription mentioned previously, some practitioners (e.g.,
Fisch et al., 1982; Haley, 1987) would urge this therapist
to act surprised if the client "spontaneously" improved
following this directive.
Three analogue studies have explored criticisms that
paradoxical interventions may have detrimental effects
on the therapeutic relationship.

Conoley and Beard (1984)

found that both symptom prescription and nondirective
interventions can be delivered in ways that are either
13

high or low in perceived empathy, warmth, and genuineness.
These researchers also found no differences between symptom
prescription and nondirective interventions in terms of
perceived attractiveness or trustworthiness,

though symptom

prescription was rated as higher in expertness.

In another

study, Perrin and Dowd (1986) found that symptom
prescription was seen as more "tricky" and "confusing"
than non-paradoxical techniques; however,

this did not

adversely affect subjects' perceptions of the therapist's
willingness or ability to help.

Finally, McMillan and

Johnson (1990) found that a counselor who implemented
cognitive-behavioral interventions was rated as more expert,
attractive, and trustworthy than one who delivered
paradoxical interventions (with or without an explanation
of this strategy).
Certainly no final conclusions can be reached on the
basis of the results of three studies whose results conflict
as much as these do, but these findings do lead one to
question whether paradoxical interventions have the negative
effects on the therapeutic relationship that their critics
expect.

This issue is clouded by the fact that some

therapists who use paradoxical interventions (e.g., Weeks

& L'Abate,

1982) speak of the benefits of less than

completely positive relationships in mobilizing resistance
to paradoxical directives--thereby accomplishing the goals
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of therapy.

However, others such as O'Connell (1983)

emphasize the importance of a strong, sincere therapeutic
relationship in the use of paradoxical interventions.
Further, there is the perennial question of how important
the therapeutic relationship is in terms of accomplishing
the goals of therapy--is it necessary or sufficient?
Paradoxical Interventions and Informed Consent
Use of deception in therapy is not consistent with
the client's right to informed consent.

The Ethical

Principles of Psychologists (APA, 1990) require that
therapists provide their clients with adequate information
so that clients may make informed decisions regarding
participation in therapy.

At its core this means that

clients must understand and agree to the treatment methods
employed in their psychotherapy (Weeks

& L'Abate,

1982).

The philosophical significance of informed consent,
like deception, has to do with the relative power of the
therapist in relation to the client.

If it can be assumed

that self-disclosure increases the power of the listener
and decreases that of the speaker (Bok, 1983), then
therapists have great power in their relationships with
clients as self-revelation typically flows in only one
direction.

Additionally, if the therapist fails to disclose

the nature and purpose of the methods used in therapy the
client's power is diminished still further.
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Seeking to

balance the distribution of power both consumers and a
number of therapists have come to stress the importance
of more client participation in the decision-making of
therapy (Coyne

& Widiger,

1978).

Corey, Corey, and Callanan

(1984) contend that therapists have a responsibility to
educate clients of their rights because therapy is a novel
situation with which many clients are unfamiliar; it should
be de-mystified as much as possible in order to facilitate
individual autonomy.
Everstine, Everstine, Heymann, True, Frey, Johnson,
and Seiden (1980) have outlined the information that they
consider prerequisite to informed consent:

(1) an

explanation of the procedures of therapy and their purposes,
(2) the role and qualifications of the therapist,

(3) any

risks and/or benefits to be expected from therapy, (4)
alternatives to therapy,

(5) a statement that questions

about the procedures of therapy will be answered at any
time, and (6) a statement that the client can terminate
therapy at any time.

However, Brown and Slee (1986) note

that this outline is historically more closely associated
with medical practice than psychotherapy and that such
specific information is usually not available for any method
of therapy.

The risks and consequences of therapy and

its alternatives are so wide-ranging and uncertain that
they prohibit ''full" presentation, thus fully informed
16

consent (Widiger

& Rorer,

1984).

To further complicate

matters, there is widespread disagreement regarding what
degree of disclosure--from a general orientation to
psychotherapy, to the therapist's preferred theory, to
descriptions of the specific interventions of therapy--is
required in order to obtain an adequate degree of informed
consent (Kolko & Milan, 1986).
In addition to the practical problems involved in
implementing informed consent with any sort of
psychotherapeutic method, there are theoretical problems
specific to paradoxical interventions.

For example, in

classic double-bind theory if the bind is commented upon
it can be escaped (Watzlawick et al.,

1967), making the

intervention impotent--and there is empirical evidence
to support this contention.

Hills et al.

(1985) found

that explaining the double-bind led to favorable evaluations
of therapists, but diminished the efficacy of the
intervention.

In light of this problem, some (Kolko &

Milan, 1986; Young, 1981-1982) have suggested that in the
use of paradoxical interventions the client's consent not
to be fully informed of the techniques to be used should
be sought.

Further, some who utilize paradoxical

interventions point out that it would be impractical for
any therapist to expose all the "machinery" of therapy
to the client (Haley, 1987; Hunsley, 1988).
17

Widiger and

Rorer (1984) conclude that it is not possible to have a
single set of ethical principles that can be applied
consistently across theoretical orientations; some
ethical relativism is necessary.
But even if the mental health professions came to
accept this sort of ethical relativism,

the legal profession

and the larger society may not be as willing to approve
of such a complicated solution.

In our increasingly

litigious society, it is not surprising that Henderson
(1987) has warned that a therapist could be held liable
for malpractice where informed consent has not been
obtained.

Thus, in view of the theoretical difficulties

involved in fully informing clients of the purposes of
paradoxical interventions and the seemingly illogical nature
of such methods, Schmidt (1986) expresses concern that
a therapist who uses them may be open to claims of
malpractice.

However, suits alleging negligence in

psychotherapy are very rare (Appelbaum & Gutheil, 1991).
In regard to the use of innovative therapies such as symptom
prescription, Simon (1987) notes that potential legal
problems hinge on whether informed consent has been obtained
and whether a specific therapy represents a substantial
departure from standard and accepted practice (i.e., at
least a respectable minority of the profession uses similar
methods and the therapy has been employed responsibly).
18

Simon goes on to say that if a particular mode of therapy
is found to be "customary," then liability is usually
precluded.

Stromberg, Haggarty, Leibenluft, McMillian,

Mishkim, Rubin, and Trilling (1988) know of no reported
cases in which a psychotherapist has been held liable for
negligent verbal therapy, but they do not rule out that
possibility.

They also caution that related claims of

failing to take precautions against the possibility of
a client harming him/herself or others are more likely
to succeed.

In the case of a directive technique, such

as symptom prescription, establishing the conditions for
legal liability may be more easily accomplished.

For

example, if a client worsens after a symptom has been
prescribed, a jury is likely to have difficulty
understanding why the therapist employed such a directive.
In a 1983 case in California, a therapist was found
negligent because she told a rather large woman to sit
on her disobedient son in order to assert parental
control--the client took this directive literally and sat
on the boy until he died of suffocation (Cormier & Cormier,
1985).
Assumptions Underlying Therapy
By now it seems clear that there are some fundamental
differences between the conceptions of the therapeutic
process that critics and proponents of these techniques
19

hold.

Advocates of paradoxical interventions have an

extremely pragmatic bent; they seem to be willing to use
whatever approach works to produce change as quickly as
possible.

Not surprisingly, they do not hold to the

traditional insight models of therapy that assume client
self-understanding must precede significant change (Young,
1981-1982).

Watzlawick et al.

(1967) argue that people

often change without knowing why--insight is not a necessary
or even a usual antecedent of change. For the therapist
who uses paradoxical interventions change is the goal;
insight is irrelevant.

On the other hand, critics such

as Martin (1986) say that paradoxical interventions may
work in the short-term, but they will not help clients
to maintain their gains or deal with related problems in
the future--because they presumably have not understood
the process of change.
Henderson (1987) has noted that the increasing use
of paradoxical interventions seems to be related to a
shifting of responsibility for change in therapy from the
client to the therapist.

Incidentally, the label "symptom

prescription" implies a doctor-patient relationship in
which a professional provides a "cure" for the client's
ailment.

Further, Fisch et al.

(1982) assert that the

therapist is an "expert" whose responsibility it is to
direct the course of treatment.
20

They add that if the client

knew whats/he should do there would be no need for therapy.
This represents another fundamental difference between
the viewpoints of the critics and proponents of these
techniques.

Traditionally, with the responsibility for

change resting with the client, therapy might continue
for a long period of time without change in the client
or the treatment approach in the hope that "resistance"
or a "lack of motivation" might soon be overcome (Weeks
& L'Abate,

1982).

Haley (1987) contends that such an

approach to therapy is more concerned with definitions
of proper therapist behavior than it is with the task of
helping clients solve their problems.

Critics of

paradoxical interventions would counter that directive
methods promote dependency upon the therapist (Van Hoose

& Kottler,

1985), which is diametrically opposed to their

purpose of promoting the client's autonomy.
Acceptability of Paradoxical Interventions
As defined for the purposes of this study,
acceptability referred to the subjective evaluation of
a treatment procedure by an individual (Kazdin, 1980a,
1980b; Witt & Elliott, 1985).

That is, how much does a

person like the treatment in question?
fair,

Is it appropriate,

and reasonable given the client's problem?

If the

client likes the interventions used in his/her therapy
then they will be more motivated to be actively involved
21

and change than if they find them objectionable.

But

perhaps a more fundamental question is the acceptability
of an intervention to those who may implement them.

Two

such groups are psychotherapists and classroom teachers.
Hirschmann and Sprenkle (1989) conducted a survey
of the clinical members of the American Association for
Marriage and Family Therapy.

Seventy-six percent of the

respondents were users of paradoxical interventions.

(It

should be noted that the field of marriage and family
therapy is much more influenced by systemic theories than
most other specializations within the broader field of
psychotherapy.

This may account for the high percentage

of respondents who used paradoxical interventions.)

They

found users of these techniques to be more directive in
their approach to therapy and less concerned with the
ethical issues related to these interventions than their
colleagues who did not employ paradoxical methods.

However,

they did not find non-users as a group to be averse to
the use of paradoxical interventions by their colleagues.
Hirschmann and Sprenkle concluded that paradoxical
interventions were a part of the repertoire of the majority
of marriage and family therapists, and that within that
field they are viewed as effective and ethically acceptable
techniques.
Gavell, Frentz, and Kelley (1986) have conducted the
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only other empirical study to address the acceptability
of paradoxical interventions.

These researchers examined

the acceptability of these techniques in the context of
altering the problem behavior of delinquent youth.

Middle

and high school teachers rated the acceptability of a
symptom prescription that had previously been demonstrated
to be effective by Kolko and Milan (1983).
et al.

The Cavell

(1986) study included five treatment conditions--four

of which involved the paradoxical intervention with
different rationales for its use and one of which involved
continuing a program of positive reinforcement that was
reported to be ineffectual.

The teachers in all four

paradoxical intervention conditions rated this treatment
as significantly less acceptable than did the group which
rated the continuation of the unsuccessful program of
reinforcement.

Additionally, there was a significant

difference in· acceptability ratings between the conditions
employing a paradoxical intervention accompanied by a
"paradoxical rationale'' (an explanation in terms of the
adolescents likelihood of defying the paradoxical directive
leading to a reduction of the problem behavior) and the
one involving "no rationale.''
less acceptable.

The latter was rated as

These results raise questions about the

acceptability of paradoxical interventions among secondary
school teachers.
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To summarize, the literature on paradoxical
interventions has been selectively reviewed with particular
attention to the ethical problems of deception and informed
consent and this treatment's acceptability.

Few studies

prior to this one have examined the acceptability of
paradoxical interventions to psychotherapists.

This study

employed a format somewhat analogous to an ethics review
board; that is, a group of professionals made judgments
as to whether a hypothetical colleague acted "acceptably"
in employing a symptom prescription.

The primary hypotheses

of this study were that in regard to the context in which
a symptom prescription is delivered, psychotherapists would
rate the intervention as les~ acceptable when:

(1) deception

was involved, and (2) informed consent was not obtained.
Secondary hypotheses also investigated were that
psychotherapists would rate a symptom prescription as less
acceptable whens/he:

(1) did not claim systems as his/her

primary theoretical orientation,

(2) was less directive

in his/her approach to psychotherapy,

(3) placed more

emphasis on insight as a requisite for change, and (4)
displayed greater sensitivity to ethical considerations.
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METHOD
Procedure and Subjects
Four hundred potential participants were randomly
selected from the Clinical section of the directory of
the Illinois Psychological Association (1989-1990).

Each

of these individuals was mailed a packet which included:
a cover letter, a demographic questionnaire, one of four
variations of a treatment vignette, two treatment
acceptability measures, a reply envelope, and a postcard
on which to request a copy of the results of the study.
One hundred forty-four usable replies were obtained
making the response rate 36%.

A majority of the respondents

indicated their primary theoretical orientation as eclectic
(56%); other theories represented were psychodynamic (22%),
cognitive (5%), humanistic (4%), behavioral (3%), systems
(3%), other (3%), and 4% did not specify a theoretical
orientation.

The gender of the participants was fairly

evenly distributed: 44% were female and 52% were male (4%
did not indicate a gender).

The mean age of the

participants was 46.2 years (SD=l0.4).

Additionally, the

participants had an average of 13.4 years of post-degree
therapy experience (SD=9.4) and an average of 22.5
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client-hours per week (SD=l2.8).

Based on these

demographics, it seemed fair to assume that the participants
were reasonably representative of the field and
well-acquainted with the practice of psychotherapy.
Materials
Demographic questionnaire.

In addition to the

demographic information already reported,

this questionnaire

included five items relating to the participant's
assumptions about psychotherapy (see Appendix A).

Rated

on a five-point Likert scale, these items addressed
attitudes about directiveness (e.g., "The therapist--not
the client--bears the primary responsibility for progress
in therapy.''), the importance of insight (e.g., "There
can be no significant change in therapy without the client
first gaining insight."), and ethical considerations (e.g.,
"The use of a deceptive intervention cannot be justified
by any amount of constructive change.").
Treatment vignettes.

The case descriptions used in

this investigation (adapted from Dowd & Milne, 1986; see
Appendix B) consisted of five paragraphs:

(1) problem,

(2) case conceptualization, (3) consent to treatment,

(4)

symptom prescription, and (S) the rationale given for the
intervention.

Paragraphs 1, 2, and 4 were the same for

all four experimental conditions.

The first paragraph

described a young man who sought counseling because of
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his compulsive vomiting and anxiety in dating situations.
The second paragraph detailed the therapist's
conceptualization of the client's problems and plan for
intervention in terms of placing the client in a therapeutic
double-bind by means of prescribing his vomiting.

The

fourth paragraph outlined the therapist's implementation
of the symptom prescription.

The third and fifth paragraphs

varied according to the experimental group of the subject.
The subjects were randomly assigned to one of the
four conditions of the study's 2 X 2 factorial design:
low deception/low informed consent (n=33), high deception/
low informed consent (~=31), low deception/high informed
consent (n=42), and high deception/high informed consent
(n=38).

The manner in which the therapist described in

the vignettes sought and obtained the client's consent
to treatment, and the rationale that was given for the
symptom prescription determined the four experimental
conditions. The specific components of the vignettes
relevant to the four conditions are described in the
following paragraphs.
Low informed consent.

In this condition the therapist

told the client that he must agree to follow the therapist's
instructions exactly--without asking any questions--before
he will be told how to solve his problem. The client then
gave his consent to proceed.

(vignettes 1 and 2)
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High informed consent.

In this condition the therapist

told the client that he will be asked to continue vomiting
for awhile, though it might seem strange or be unpleasant.
The therapist offered to answer any questions that the
young man might have at any time during treatment.
client then gave his consent to proceed.

The

(vignettes 3

and 4)
Low deception.

In this condition the therapist

disclosed to the client the rationale of the therapeutic
double-bind that led to the formulation of the symptom
prescription.

(vignettes 1 and 3)

High deception.

In this condition the rationale that

the client was given for the symptom prescription was that
it would increase his awareness of the causes of his
vomiting so that a plan to eliminate it could be developed.
(vignettes 2 and 4)
A counseling psychologist unfamiliar with this study
evaluated the four treatment vignettes in terms of their
levels of informed consent and deception and correctly
identified all four treatment conditions.
Acceptability measures.

Two different instruments

were used in this study to measure treatment acceptability,
the Treatment Evaluation Inventory--Short Form (TEI-SF;
Kelley, Heffer, Gresham, & Elliott, 1989) and the
Intervention Rating Profile-15 (IRP-15; Witt & Elliott,
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1985).
The TEI-SF (see Appendix C) is a 9-item scale which
asks respondents to rate various aspects of the
acceptability of an intervention used to treat a child's
problem on a 5-point Likert scale.

This instrument is

a revision of Kazdin's (1980a) original TEI.

A coefficient

alpha estimate of the internal consistency of the TEI-SF
has been reported by Kelley et al. (1989) as .85.

These

authors also provide validity data in the form of the
TEI-SF's ability to discriminate among treatments at the
.01 level of significance.
The IRP-15 (see Appendix C) is a 15-item scale which
also requires subjects to evaluate several aspects of the
acceptability of a procedure used to treat a child's
behavior problem using a 6-point Likert scale. The IRP-15
is a revision of the original 20-item IRP (Witt & Martens,
1983) with a simplified factor structure (the original
scale had one primary factor and four secondary factors,
while the IRP-15 has a single factor).

Elliott, Turco,

and Gresham (1987) report a .98 coefficient alpha estimate
of the internal consistency of the IRP-15.

Regarding

validity, several studies (Elliott et al., 1987; Hall &
Didier, 1987; Hall & Wahrman, 1988) have reported that
the IRP-15 effectively discriminated among interventions
in terms of acceptability.
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Since both of these measures were designed specifically
for the evaluation of behavioral interventions with children
in school and institutional settings, the following minor
changes in the wording of these measures were deemed
appropriate for this investigation.

"Child," "teacher,"

"classroom," and "problem behavior" or "behavior problem"
were replaced by "client," "therapist," "therapy," and
"problem," respectively.
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RESULTS
Factor Analysis
Because the IRP-15 and the TEI-SF have not seen
widespread use, it seemed important to verify their
psychometric properties.

However, the statistical package

used in this study (SYSTAT-Version 4.1; Wilkinson, 1989)
will not compute coefficient alpha estimates of reliability,
so a decision was made to factor analyze the IRP-15 and
the TEI-SF.

This was done to develop more stable and

homogeneous measures of treatment acceptability for the
purposes of this study.
The 24 items composing the IRP-15 and the TEI-SF were
subjected to a principal components analysis with varimax
rotation.

The criteria used in determining the number

of factors were: the factors with eigenvalues greater than
one, the scree test, the amount of variance accounted for
by the factor solution, and the meaningfulness of the factor
solution.

Two factors emerged which combined to account

for 71% of the total variance.

These components

approximated the factor structures reported for the
unifactorial IRP-15 (Hall

& Didier, 1987; Hall & Wahrman,

1988) and the duofactorial TEI-SF (Kelley et al., 1989).
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Table 1 reports the items and their loadings on each factor.
Factor 1 was composed of 14 items from the IRP-15
and 6 items from the TEI-SF with item loadings ranging
from .90 to .73.
total variance.

This factor accounted for 60% of the
Factor 1 was named General Acceptability

as it seemed to reflect a variety issues regarding the
appropriateness of an intervention, including:

willingness

to use a treatment, willingness to recommend a treatment
to colleagues,

judgments of an intervention's sensibility,

perceptions of a treatment's potential efficacy for a
particular problem and additional ones, and perceptions
of colleagial reactions to the type of intervention
described.
Factor 2 was composed of 3 items from the TEI-SF and
1 item from the IRP-15 and accounted for 11% of the total
variance.
.71 to .58.

The item loadings on this factor ranged from
The items making up this factor focused on

the acceptability of an intervention in light of the ethical
considerations of consent to treatment and the possibility
of negative side effects for the client.

Factor 2 was

named Ethical Acceptability as its items seemed to relate
to an element of the broader General Acceptability factor.
As might be expected, the two factors were found to be
moderately correlated (r=.47; see Table 2).
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TABLE 1
Factor Loadings for the Intervention Rating Profile-IS and the Treatment Evaluation Inventory-Short Form
with Varimax Rotation
Factor
1
2
Factor 1: Acceptability
14. I would suggest the use of this intervention to other therapists.
.90
.12
.21
.88
112. This intervention is reasonable for the problem described.
13. This intervention should prove effective in changing the client's problem.
.88
.06
.18
.88
17. I would be willing to use this intervention in a therapy setting.
Tl. I find this treatment to be an acceptable way of dealing with the client's problem.
.88
.20
.88
.21
T9. Overall, I have a positive reaction to this treatment.
113. I liked the procedures used in this intervention.
.87
.18
.16
.87
TS. I believe this treatment is likely to be effective.
T2. I would be willing to use this procedure if I had to change the client's problem.
.87
.23
.84
.25
T4. I like the procedures used in this treatment.
Il. This would be an acceptable intervention for the client's problem.
.84
.20
.84
.24
IS. The client's problem is severe enough to warrant use of this intervention.
110. This intervention is consistent with those I have used in therapy settings.
.83
.13
.82
.35
114. This intervention was a good way to handle the client's problem.
IlS. Overall, this intervention would be beneficial for the client.
.81
.35
• 77
.41
Ill. The intervention was a fair way to handle the client's problem.
19. This intervention would be appropriate for a variety of clients.
.76
.25
• 76 · .07
16. Most therapists would find this intervention suitable for the problem described.
12. Most therapists would find this intervention appropriate for problems in addition to
.75 -.OS
the one described.
T7. I believe this treatment is likely to result in permanent improvement.
.73
.24
Factor 2: Ethical Issues
T3. I believe that it would be acceptable to use this treatment without a client's consent. .20
.37
18. This intervention would not result in negative side effects for the client.
T6. I [do not] believe the client will experience discomfort during the treatment.
-.20
.47
TB. I believe it would be acceptable to use this treatment with individuals who cannot
choose treatments for themselves.
Total Variance Explained
.60

• 71

.66
.59
.58
.11

TABLE 2
Pearson Correlation Matrix
1
1.

L,J

.p..

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

9.
10.

Age
Years experience
Hours per week
Attitude 1
Attitude 2
Attitude 3
Attitude 4
Attitude 5
Factor 1
Factor 2

2

3

.03
.13
.04
.08
.28
-.14
-.09
-.06

-.07
.23
-.04
-.12
-.24
.06
.07

4

5

6

7

8

.02
.13
.18

-.14
-.24

9

.78**

.oo
.14
.12
.16
• 28
-.02
-.17
-.13

n=107
Using Bonferroni correction method:
*2_<.05
**2_<.001

-.07
-.20
.01

.oo

.08
-.03

.19
.01
-.01
-.19
-.03

-.10
.37*
-.43-ff
-.21

.47**
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Descriptive Statistics
Means and standard deviations on the dependent
variables of General Acceptability and Ethical Acceptability
by the grouping variables of treatment condition, gender,
and theoretical orientation are presented in Table 3.
The full sample means on General Acceptability (2.70) and
Ethical Acceptability (2.31) were slightly below the
midpoints of 2.85 and 2.63, respectively.

No significant

differences among the dependent variables were found based
on these independent variables, with one exception.

When

the psychodynamic and eclectic groups were compared across
treatment conditions (the cell sizes of the other
theoretical orientations were deemed too small for reliable
comparisons), it was found that the psychodynamic
therapists' ratings were significantly lower on General
Acceptability than those of the eclectic therapists, ~(111)
=2.475, ~<.05.
Analysis of Variance and Analysis of Covariance
The primary purpose of this study was to examine the
effects of using deception and informed consent on
therapists' ratings of the acceptability of symptom
prescription.

This was accomplished using a 2 (low

deception/high deception) X 2 (low informed consent/high
informed consent) analysis of variance.

However, no

significant main or interaction effects were found on either
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TABLE 3
Summary Statistics for Factor 1 and Factor 2 by Treatment, Gender,
and Theoretical Orientation
Factor 1
M
SD

Factor 2
M
SD

Treatment Group
Low Deception/Low Consent (n=33)
High Deception/Low Consent (n=31)
Low Deception/High Consent (n=42)
High Deception/High Consent (n=38)

2.47
2.66
2. 77
2.86

.95
1.14
1.09
1.20

2.29
2.33
2.24
2.39

.78
• 75
.79

Gender
Female (n=63)
Male (n=75)
Unspecified (n=6)

2.50
2.87
2.75

1.05
1.14
.96

2.24
2.37
2.29

.80
.75
.80

Theoretical Orientation
Behavioral (n=4)
Cognitive (n=7)
Humanistic (n=6)
Psychodynamic (n=32)
Systems (n=4)
Eclectic C.!!.=80)
Other (n=5)
Unspecified (n=6)

3.19
2.28
2.87
2.28*
3.45
2.85*
2.78
2.46

1.26
1.11
1.02
1.06
1.67
1.10
.90
.69

3.06
1.96
2.79
2.42
2.25
2.27
1.92
1.96

.83
.73
.89
.81
1.46
• 70
.41
.73

All Groups (N=144)

2.70

1.09

2.31

• 77

• 77

*Theoretical differences were found to be statistically significant,
_£<.05.
Note: Factor 1 was composed of fourteen items ranked on a six point
scale and six items ranked on a five point scale (range=l.00-5.70).
Factor 2 was composed of three items ranked on a five point scale and
one item ranked on a six point scale (range=l.00-5.25).
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General Acceptability or Ethical Acceptability (see Table
4).

In addition, a 2 X 2 analysis of covariance was

performed using theoretical orientation as the covariate
(psychodynamic or eclectic).

Table 5 shows that this

strategy also failed to yield any significant main or
interaction effects on General Acceptability or Ethical
Acceptability.

Therefore, the context in which the symptom

prescription was delivered was not found to effect
psychotherapists' ratings of the intervention's
acceptability.
Multiple Regression Analyses
A secondary focus of this study was examine whether
therapists' attitudes would be related to their ratings
of the acceptability of symptom prescription.

To this

end, separate stepwise multiple regressions were employed
using the therapy attitude items on the demographics
questionnaire (see Appendix A) to predict General and
Ethical Acceptability ratings for each condition.

Before

the results of this procedure are described, it should
be noted that the third attitude variable (use of deception
cannot be justified) evidenced a significant correlation
with both the fifth attitude variable (no intervention
should be used without informed consent) and the General
Acceptability factor (£=.37, E<.05, and £=-.43, E<.001,
respectively; see Table 2).
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TABLE 4
2 X 2 Analysis of Variance Effects of Deception and Informed Consent on Factor 1 and
Factor 2
Factor 1

Deception
Consent
Deception X Consent

ss
.68
2.22
.11

Factor 2

F
.56
1.82
.09

.E.

.46
.18
• 76

Deception
Consent
Deception X Consent

ss
.35

F
.58

.11

.19

.oo

.oo

.E.

.45
.98
.67

N=144

TABLE 5
2 X 2 Analysis of Covariance Effects of Deception and Informed Consent on Factor 1 and
Factor 2 using Theoretical Orientation (Psychodynamic and Eclectic) as Covariate
Factor 1

Theory
Deception
Consent
Deception X Consent
n=l12

ss
6.66
.10

.OS
.24

Factor 2

F
5.49
.08
.04
.20

.E.

.02
.78
.85
.66

Theory
Deception
Consent
Deception X Consent

ss
.46
.06
.15
.04

F
.84
.11
• 27
.08

.E.

.36
.74
.61
.78

Regression of the General Acceptability factor onto
the five attitude variables,

by treatment condition,

revealed only the "deception cannot be justified" item
as a significant predictor (see Table 6).

This item was

a predictor of General Acceptability in the low
2

deception/low informed consent (R =.40; ,E_<.001), low
2

deception/high informed consent (R =.10; .E_<.05), and high
2

deception/high informed consent (R =.15; .£<. 05) treatment
groups.

However, none of the attitude variables

significantly predicted General Acceptability ratings in
the high deception/low informed consent group.

Finally,

when all four treatment groups were combined this attitude
variable accounted for 16% of the variance (_£<.001) in
General Acceptability ratings.

In each case in which it

was identified as a significant predictor, the "deception
cannot be justified" item was negatively related to General
Acceptability.
The stepwise multiple regression procedure yielded
a much less consistent set of predictors when the Ethical
Acceptability ratings were regressed onto the attitude
variables by treatment condition (see Table 6).

The

attitude predictors which reached statistical significance
fluctuated among treatment conditions.

In the low

deception/low informed consent condition, the "no
intervention should be employed without informed consent"
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TABLE 6
Summar! of SteEwise Regression Analises Using Attitude Variables to Predict
Factor 1 and Factor 2
Factor 1

.i:-0

R2

Group

Predictor

Low Deception/Low Consent
High Deception/Low Consent
Low Deception/High Consent
High Deception/High Consent
All Conditions

Attitude 3

.40

19.25

(1,29)

.oo

Attitude 3
Attitude 3
Attitude 3

.10
.15
.16

4.15
6.27
26.30

(1,39)
(1,35)
(1,134)

.05
.02

Psychodynamic
Eclectic

Attitudes 3+2
Attitude 3

.55
.06

16.83
5.18

(2,28)
(1,76)

F

df

.£.

.oo
.oo
.03

Factor 2

R2

F

df

Attitude 5
Attitude 3
Attitude 4
Attitude 5
Attitudes 3+4

.20
.24
.12
.13
.11

7.13
7.76
5.09
4.87
7.89

(1,29)
(1,25)
(1, 39)
(1, 34)
(2,133)

.01
.01
.03
.03

Attitude 3
Attitude 5

.17
.08

6.10
6.23

(1,29)
( 1, 77)

.02
.02

Group

Predictor(s)

Low Deception/Low Consent
High Deception/Low Consent
Low Deception/High Consent
High Deception/High Consent
All Conditions
Psychodynamic
Eclectic

Note: alpha-to-enter and alpha-to-remove= .OS

.£.

.oo

item accounted for 20% of the variance in Ethical
Acceptability ratings (~<.05).

In the high deception/low

informed consent condition, the "deception cannot be
justified" item accounted for 24% of the variance in the
dependent variable (~<.05).

For the low deception/high

informed consent group, the "use the intervention which
produces change" item accounted for 12% of the variance
in the dependent measure (~<.05).

Finally, in the high

deception/high informed consent condition,

the "no

intervention should be employed without informed consent"
item accounted for 13% of the variance in Ethical
Acceptability ratings (~<.05).

When all four treatment

conditions were grouped together, the "deception cannot
be justified" and "use the intervention which produces
change most efficiently" items emerged as significant
predictors combining to account for 11% of the variance
in Ethical Acceptability ratings (~<.01).

When the

"deception cannot be justified" and "no intervention should
be employed without informed consent" items were identified
as significant predictors, they were negatively related
to Ethical Acceptability.

In contrast, the "use the

intervention which produces change" item was positively
related to Ethical Acceptability.
Because of the significant differences in the General
Acceptability ratings of psychodynamic and eclectic
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therapists and the inconsistent set of predictors identified
for Ethical Acceptability, additional stepwise regression
procedures were performed.

The psychodynamic and eclectic

groups were considered across treatment conditions using
the attitude variables as predictors (see Table 6).

For

the psychodynamic group, General Acceptability ratings
were negatively related to the "deception cannot be
justified" and "no real change without insight" items
2

(R =.55; .£_<.001).

Only the "deception cannot be justified"

item was related to Ethical Acceptability for the
2

psychodynamic group (R =.17; .£_<.05).
therapists,

For the eclectic

the "deception cannot be justified" item emerged

as negatively related to General Acceptability

(l

2

=.06;

.£_<.05), and the "no intervention should be employed without
informed consent" item related negatively to Ethical
2

Acceptability (R =.08; .£_<.05).
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DISCUSSION
Use of Deception and Informed Consent and the Acceptability
of Symptom Prescription
The primary question this study addressed was:

Does

the use of deception and/or informed consent in the delivery
of a symptom prescription affect its acceptability to
therapists?

However,

the results of this study did not

support the conclusion that the presence (or absence) of
deception and/or informed consent significantly impact
the General or Ethical Acceptability of a symptom
prescription.

Further, when theoretical differences were

taken into consideration, no differences were found in
the acceptability of symptom prescription when the levels
of deception and informed consent were manipulated.
Beyond the real possibility that the use of deception
and informed consent do not significantly influence the
acceptability of symptom prescription, there are at least
two plausible reasons for this study's lack of conclusive
findings.

First, because no manipulation check was included

in the study, it is not certain that the subjects perceived
the treatment conditions as sufficiently distinct in regard
to the independent variables.

Second, the particular
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symptom prescription involved (i.e., instructing the client
to vomit) may have prevented any differences based on the
treatment conditions from being detected; perhaps
instructing the client to vomit was equally objectionable
to the therapists across treatment conditions.
So the questions of whether and how the use of
deception and informed consent affect the acceptability
of symptom prescription remain unanswered.
basis of the foregoing,

But on the

one might tentatively conclude

(realizing the dangers of arguing from null results), that
we should look elsewhere in trying to understand why
paradoxical interventions are so controversial.

Perhaps

the key is whether paradoxical interventions can be
accommodated by one's primary theoretical orientation--an
idea for which this study provides preliminary support.
However, this study also identified a relationship between
therapists' attitudes about the use of deception and lack
of informed consent and the acceptability of the symptom
prescription.
Assumptions about Psychotherapy and Acceptability of Symptom
Prescription
The secondary question this study addressed was:
What are some of the attitudes that therapists hold which
relate to their judgments of a symptom prescription's
acceptability?

The results of the study allow this question
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to be answered more conclusively.

General Acceptability

was related to theoretical orientation and attitudes about
the use of deception and of the role of insight in therapy.
Ethical Acceptability was associated with attitudes about
the use of deception and informed consent, as well as with
an attitude which says essentially "the end justifies the
means."
The relationship between theoretical orientation and
General Acceptability was not surprising.

Psychodynamic

therapists found the symptom prescription to be
significantly less acceptable than did the eclectic
therapists.

These theoretical differences could be

anticipated as the traditional psychodynamic therapist
who employs an insight-oriented approach to therapy would
be expected to react negatively to the directive nature
of symptom prescription.

While those therapists who choose

to call themselves "eclectic" could be expected to be more
pragmatic and flexible in their modes of intervention.
Another attitude variable which emerged as related
to General Acceptability of symptom prescription was the
"deception cannot be justified by any amount of change"
item.

This item was negatively related to acceptability

so that the more strongly a subject agreed with this
statement, the less acceptable the intervention was to
him/her, and vice versa.

However, this attitude variable
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did not relate to General Acceptability in the high
deception/low informed consent condition.

This condition

should have been the most objectionable leading the
deception item, and perhaps the consent item, to be
predictive, but that was obviously not the case.

Perhaps

many of the subjects in this condition reasoned that a
symptom prescription could only be effective in a high
deception/low informed consent context--which is consistent
with the classic double-bind theory.

This could have led

to their attitudes about the use of deception and informed
consent being less predictive of acceptability than they
would normally have been.
Finally, for the psychodynamic therapists, the attitude
that insight is prerequisite to significant change combined
with the deception variable to account for over half of
the variance in General Acceptability.

This finding was

not surprising because the client's development of insight
is seen as so very fundamental by psychodynamically-oriented
therapists, but is usually ignored in the use of symptom
prescription.

However, the key attitude related to General

Acceptability across groups was that regarding deception
as it appeared once again--this time as the only signficant
predictor for the eclectic therapists.
The attitude variables related to the secondary factor
of Ethical Acceptability were less consistent and more
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diverse making their interpretation more problematic.
When all the treatment conditions were grouped together,
the deception attitude was again the most significant
predictor, but this time in tandem with the positively
related therapeutic pragmatism item (use the intervention
which produces change).

That is, the more pragmatic the

therapist indicated s/he was, the more Ethically Acceptable
s/he rated the symptom prescription (and vice versa).
In addition to its role in predicting Ethical Acceptability
for the entire sample, the therapeutic pragmatism item
was related to Ethical Acceptability in the low
deception/high informed consent condition.

However, it

is worth noting that this treatment condition should be
the least objectionable, and so the positive relationship
between this attitude and acceptability ratings is not
very surprising.
The deception item was the only one related to Ethical
Acceptability in the high deception/low informed consent
condition.

Interesting to note, this is the only condition

in which this attitude was not predictive of General
Acceptability.

These results show the "deception cannot

be justified" item to be the one most consistently related
to acceptability across treatment groups and dependent
measures.

It is also interesting to note that the

therapists' attitu~es about deception were related to
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acceptability, while actual differences in the use of
deception were not.

Perhaps this is but another example

of the discrepancies that are often found between persons'
attitudes and their presumably related behaviors (Myers,

1987).
Finally, in both the low deception/low informed consent
and high deception/high informed consent conditions the
informed consent item (no intervention should be used
without informed consent) emerged as a negatively related
predictor.

That is, those who agreed with this item tended

to judge the symptom prescription as less Ethically
Acceptable (and vice versa).

Once again, the nature of

the relationship between this attitude and acceptability
is not surprising.

However, offering reasons for why this

attitude emerged as predictive in these treatment conditions
involves mere speculation.

One could surmise that in the

low deception/low informed consent condition that since
consent rather than deception was at issue, it makes sense
that the consent attitude was related to Ethical
Acceptability.

However, such an interpretation does not

leave room to explain with consistency why this attitude
variable was predictive in the high deception/high informed
consent condition.

One might note the significance of

the correlation between the deception and consent attitude
variables, then proceed to say that it was merely chance
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which led the consent item to be predictive rather than
the deception item for this particular condition.

But

such an understanding leads to ever greater inconsistencies
with the interpretations of the other treatment conditions.
Finally, Ethical Acceptability was related to the
deception attitude variable for the psychodynamic therapists
and the the informed consent attitude for the eclectic
therapists.

These findings serve to reinforce the large

role that attitudes about deception and informed consent
played in determining the Ethical Acceptability of symptom
prescription.
Limitations of this Study
The weaknesses of this study can be divided into two
groups, those bearing primarily on internal validity and
those restricting external validity.

Two limitations in

regard to internal validity have been discussed earlier,
but their importance bears repeating.

First, because there

was no manipulation check on the deception and informed
consent independent variables included in the study proper,
it is not certain whether the treatment conditions were
perceived as being sufficiently distinct.

Second, there

are questions about the specific symptom prescription used
in the treatment vignettes and how that may have led to
null results in regard to the primary questions this study
sought to address.

Both of these limitations could have
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been addressed more fully by the inclusion of a more
substantial pilot study.
Regarding the external validity of this study, there
were two more important limitations.

First, because only

36% of those who were selected to participate in this study
returned their packets, it is impossible to know if the
other 64% differed from those who participated in this
study in a meaningful way--perhaps some sort of
self-selection bias was manifested.

Second, only the

psychodynamic and eclectic theoretical groups were
represented by sufficient numbers to draw conclusions about
their perceptions of the acceptability of symptom
prescription--the evaluations of behavioral, cognitive,
or family systems therapists may have been different.
Future Research
As mentioned earlier, only two other studies in the
published literature have addressed the acceptability of
symptom prescription to psychotherapists, and so this issue
definitely warrants further empirical research.

Certainly

this study would bear systematic and conceptual replication.
Such investigations might profitably use another example
of symptom prescription (or other type of paradoxical
intervention), a broader sample of theoretical orientations,
and a broader sample of the therapeutic specialties (e.g.,
pastoral counseling, psychiatry, and social work).

so

Further,

it could prove important to extend the examination of the
acceptability of symptom prescription to clients--the
ultimate consumers of psychotherapy.

But perhaps the most

interesting question this study raised has to do with the
lack of congruence between therapists' attitudes about
the use of deception and informed consent and their
judgments of the acceptability of symptom prescription
when the levels of deception and informed consent were
manipulated.
Summary
Symptom prescription is the most directive and
controversial of a group of unconventional techniques called
paradoxical interventions.

So it is not surprising to

find--as this study did--that such a method is more
acceptable to eclectic psychotherapists than to more
traditional, insight-oriented psychodynamic therapists.
A review of the literature revealed that the use of
deception and a lack of informed consent are often part
of the context in which paradoxical interventions are
delivered.

Accordingly, it seemed likely that these ethical

problems could be important in contributing to the
controversy surrounding paradoxical interventions.
Nevertheless, manipulating these salient ethical aspects
of the context of a symptom prescription did not evidence
a statistically significant effect on therapists'
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perceptions of the acceptability of the intervention in
this study.

However,

the results of this study do suggest

that psychotherapists' attitudes about deception and
informed consent were related to their judgments of the
acceptability of the symptom prescription.
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APPENDIX A
Demographics Questionnaire
Please indicate your current status in regard to the following
items.
Age:

Gender:

Female

Male

Years of post-degree therapy experience:
Primary theoretical orientation:
Behavioral
- - Cognitive
- - Humanistic
- - Psychodynamic
- - Systems
- - Eclectic
Other
Current number of client-hours per week:
Please circle the number that best represents your level of
agreement with the following statements about psychotherapy
(l=Strongly disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=Neutral, 4=Agree, 5=Strongly
agree).
1. The therapist-not the client-bears the primary responsibility
for progress in therapy.
1
2
3
4
5
2. There can be no significant change in therapy without the client
first gaining insight.
1
2
3
4
5
3. The use of a deceptive intervention cannot be justified by
any amount of constructive change.
1
2
3
4
5
4. The most appropriate intervention is always the one that
produces behavioral change most efficiently.
1
2
3
4
5
5. No therapeutic intervention should be employed without first
gaining the client's informed consent.
1
2
3
4
5
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APPENDIX B
Vignette #1
A young man sought therapy due to his compulsive vomiting
(a physician determined that there were no physical causes of
the vomiting). This client was so anxious about going on dates
with eligible young women that he felt numerous urges to vomit
during the course of the evening. His frequent absences to the
bathroom understandably hindered his attempts at establishing
intimate relationships, and he had developed a strong secondary
anxiety (i.e., he had become very anxious about the prospect of
becoming anxious, thus increasing his anxiety). He had begun
avoiding dating situations entirely and had become extremely
pessimistic about his ever being able to establish a permanent
relationship with a woman.
Reasoning that the anxiety and the vomiting had become
part of a self-perpetuating system that seemed to be out of the
client's control, the therapist decided to intervene directly
with the problem behavior. The therapist wanted to help the client
gain control over an apparently spontaneous behavior-the vomiting.
The intervention chosen was to instruct the client to vomit
voluntarily. The therapist believed that this intervention would
result in one of two outcomes: (1) the young man would be unable
to vomit intentionally and the problem would be resolved, or (2)
the vomiting might continue, but there would be less anxiety
associated with it (making it more manageable) because the client
was being directed to continue vomiting.
Before implementing the treatment, the therapist stated:
"I know how to solve your problem, but I need you to trust me
on this. Before I tell you, I need you to agree to follow my
instructions exactly, without asking any questions. Will you
do that?" The client agreed.
The primary therapeutic strategy consisted of instructing
the client to go into the bathroom exactly forty-five minutes
before an upcoming date--with toothbrush in hand and mouthwash
at hand-and to vomit deliberately for as long as he could.
The rationale that was given to the client for following
these instructions was as follows: "The reason that I want you
to do this is that I think it will help you gain control over
your vomiting-something that seems to be out of your control
now. If you can vomit as I've directed you to, you will
demonstrate that you really do have control over it, and you won't
be anxious about it because I've given you permission to vomit.
But I imagine that it will be difficult for you to vomit on
purpose, and if that's the case, your problem will be solved."
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Vignette #2
A young man sought therapy due to his compulsive vomiting
(a physician determined that there were no physical causes of
the vomiting). This client was so anxious about going on dates
with eligible young women that he felt numerous urges to vomit
during the course of the evening. His frequent absences to the
bathroom understandably hindered his attempts at establishing
intimate relationships, and he had developed a strong secondary
anxiety (i.e., he had become very anxious about the prospect of
becoming anxious, thus increasing his anxiety). He had begun
avoiding dating situations entirely and had become extremely
pessimistic about his ever being able to establish a permanent
relationship with a woman.
Reasoning that the anxiety and the vomiting had become
part of a self-perpetuating system that seemed to be out of the
client's control, the therapist decided to intervene directly
with the problem behavior. The therapist wanted to help the client
gain control over an apparently spontaneous behavior-the vomiting.
The intervention chosen was to instruct the client to vomit
voluntarily. The therapist believed that this intervention would
result in one of two outcomes: (1) the young man would be unable
to vomit intentionally and the problem would be resolved, or (2)
the vomiting might continue, but there would be less anxiety
associated with it (making it more manageable) because the client
was being directed to continue vomiting.
Before implementing the treatment, the therapist stated:
"I know how to solve your problem, but I need you to trust me
on this. Before I tell you, I need you to agree to follow my
instructions exactly, without asking any questions. Will you
do that?" The client agreed.
The primary therapeutic strategy consisted of instructing
the client to go into the bathroom exactly forty-five minutes
before an upcoming date-with toothbrush in hand and mouthwash
at hand-and to vomit deliberately for as long as he could.
Concerned that telling the client the actual nature of
the intervention would diminish its therapeutic effects, the
following rationale was given to the client: "You should follow
my instructions in order to increase your awareness of the causes
of the vomiting. Pay close attention to your thoughts, feelings,
and sensations before, during, and after you vomit. Write these
things down and bring them to our next session. This will help
us to more effectively plan how to eliminate your problem."
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Vignette #3
A young man sought therapy due to his compulsive vomiting
(a physician determined that there were no physical causes of
the vomiting). This client was so anxious about going on dates
with eligible young women that he felt numerous urges to vomit
during the course of the evening. His frequent absences to the
bathroom understandably hindered his attempts at establishing
intimate relationships, and he had developed a strong secondary
anxiety (i.e., he had become very anxious about the prospect of
becoming anxious, thus increasing his anxiety). He had begun
avoiding dating situations entirely and had become extremely
pessimistic about his ever being able to establish a permanent
relationship with a woman.
Reasoning that the anxiety and the vomiting had become
part of a self-perpetuating system that seemed to be out of the
client's control, the therapist decided to intervene directly
with the problem behavior. The therapist wanted to help the client
gain control over an apparently spontaneous behavior-the vomiting.
The intervention chosen was to instruct the client to vomit
voluntarily. The therapist believed that this intervention would
result in one of two outcomes: (1) the young man would be unable
to vomit intentionally and the problem would be resolved, or (2)
the vomiting might continue, but there would be less anxiety
associated with it (making it more manageable) because the client
was being directed to continue vomiting.
Before implementing the treatment, the therapist stated:
"There are many ways that we could address your problem, and I
have an idea that I'd like to try with your permission. I know
it will sound strange to you and it may even be unpleasant, but
I'd like to ask you to continue vomiting for awhile. If you have
any questions about this I will answer them now or as they come
up later in treatment. Is that O.K. with you?" The client agreed.
The primary therapeutic strategy consisted of instructing
the client to go into the bathroom exactly forty-five minutes
before an upcoming date-with toothbrush in hand and mouthwash
at hand--and to vomit deliberately for as long as he could.
The rationale that was given to the client for following
these instructions was as follows: "The reason that I want you
to do this is that I think it will help you gain control over
your vomiting--something that seems to be out of your control
now. If you can vomit as I've directed you to, you will
demonstrate that you really do have control over it, and you won't
be anxious about it because I've given you permission to vomit.
But I imagine that it will be difficult for you to vomit on
purpose, and if that's the case, your problem will be solved."
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Vignette #4
A young man sought therapy due to his compulsive vomiting
(a physician determined that there were no physical causes of
the vomiting). This client was so anxious about going on dates
with eligible young women that he felt numerous urges to vomit
during the course of the evening. His frequent absences to the
bathroom understandably hindered his attempts at establishing
intimate relationships, and he had developed a strong secondary
anxiety (i.e., he had become very anxious about the prospect of
becoming anxious, thus increasing his anxiety). He had begun
avoiding dating situations entirely and had become extremely
pessimistic about his ever being able to establish a permanent
relationship with a woman.
Reasoning that the anxiety and the vomiting had become
part of a self-perpetuating system that seemed to be out of the
client's control, the therapist decided to intervene directly
with the problem behavior. The therapist wanted to help the client
gain control over an apparently spontaneous behavior--the vomiting.
The intervention chosen was to instruct the client to vomit
voluntarily. The therapist believed that this intervention would
result in one of two outcomes: (1) the young man would be unable
to vomit intentionally and the problem would be resolved, or (2)
the vomiting might continue, but there would be less anxiety
associated with it (making it more manageable) because the client
was being directed to continue vomiting.
Before implementing the treatment, the therapist stated:
"There are many ways that we could address your problem, and I
have an idea that I'd like to try with your permission. I know
it will sound strange to you and it may even be unpleasant, but
I'd like to ask you to continue vomiting for awhile. If you have
any questions about this I will answer them now or as they come
up later in treatment. Is that O.K. with you?" The client agreed.
The primary therapeutic strategy consisted of instructing
the client to go into the bathroom exactly forty-five minutes
before an upcoming date-with toothbrush in hand and mouthwash
at hand-and to vomit deliberately for as long as he could.
Concerned that telling the client the actual nature of
the intervention would diminish its therapeutic effects, the
following rationale was given to the client: "You should follow
my instructions in order to increase your awareness of the causes
of the vomiting. Pay close attention to your thoughts, feelings,
and sensations before, during, and after you vomit. Write these
things down and bring them to our next session. This will help
us to more effectively plan how to eliminate your problem."
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APPENDIX C
Treatment Evaluation Inventory--Short Form
Instructions: Please respond to the items listed below by circling
the number that best indicates how you feel about the treatment
decribed in the preceding vignette (!=Strongly disagree,
2=Disagree, 3=Neutral, 4=Agree, 5=Strongly agree).

1. I find this treatment to be an acceptable way of dealing with
the client's problem.
1
2
3
4
5
2. I would be willing to use this procedure if I had to change
the client's problem.
1
2
3
4
5
3. I believe that it would be acceptable to use this treatment
without a client's consent.
1
2
3
4
5
4. I like the procedures used in this treatment.
1
2
3
4
5
5. I believe this treatment is likely to be effective.
1
2
3
4
5
will
experience
discomfort
during
client
the
believe
the
6. I
treatment.
1
2
3
4
5
treatment
is
likely
to
result
in
permanent
I
believe
this
7.
improvement.
2
4
1
3
5
would
be
acceptable
to
use
this
treatment
I
believe
it
with
8.
individuals who cannot choose treatments for themselves.
2
4
1
3
5
9. Overall, I have a positive reaction to this treatment.
2
4
1
3
5
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Intervention Rating Profile-15
Instructions: The purpose of this questionnaire is to obtain
information that will aid in the selection of therapeutic
interventions. Please indicate the number which best describes
your level of agreement or disagreement with each statement
(l=Strongly disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=Slightly disagree, 4=Slightly
agree, 5=Agree, 6=Strongly agree).

1. This would be an acceptable intervention for the client's
problem.
1
2
3
4
5
6
2. Most therapists would find this intervention appropriate for
problems in addition to the one described.
1
2
3
4
5
6
3. This intervention should prove effective in changing
the client's problem.
1
2
3
4
5
6
4. I would suggest the use of this intervention to other
therapists.
1
2
3
4
5
6
5. The client's problem is severe enough to warrant use of this
intervention.
1
2
3
4
5
6
6. Most therapists would find this intervention suitable for
the problem described.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7. I would be willing to use this intervention in a therapy
setting.
1
2
3
4
5
6
8. This intervention would not result in negative side effects
for the client.
1
2
3
4
5
6
9. This intervention would be appropriate for a variety of
clients.
1
2
3
4
5
6
10. This intervention is consistent with those I have used in
therapy settings.
1
2
3
4
5
6
11. The intervention was a fair way to handle the client's problem.
1
2
3
4
5
6
12. This intervention is reasonable for the problem described.
1
2
3
4
5
6
13. I liked the procedures used in this intervention.
1
2
3
4
5
6
14. This intervention was a good way to handle the client's
problem.
1
2
3
4
5
6
15. Overall, this intervention would be beneficial for the client.
1
2
3
4
5
6
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